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Computer Systems for 
Research 
by Layman E. Allen* 
Attention in this panel is shifted from a consideration of the 
legal implications of modern communications technology to an 
examination of its potentials for improving the communication 
network in those affairs of men that we call the law. Our dis-
cussion will be somewhat of a smorgasbord-a selection from 
among many potential applications within the legal communi-
cation network. My introductory remarks will touch lightly on 
research in law. Others on the program will broaden the dis-
cussion to include the courts, the practicing lawyer, and, in part, 
the general public. 
Characteristics of Legal Communication Network 
The legal communication network today is characterized by two 
features. Any communication network in this century is marked 
by a division between the extent to which there is a man involved 
and the extent to which there is a machine involved. And, in terms 
of emphasis at this stage of things, at least within law, the empha-
sis is heavily upon the man communicating messages and relatively 
less upon the machine. The interesting question is, What is going 
on within this network that is amenable to being handled by 
machine and what, among those things, is it wise to do that way? 
*Professor of Law, The University of Michigan Law School, Ann Arbor, 
Michigan. 
101 
102 / THE LAW OF COMPUTERS 
A second and limiting characteristic of the legal communication 
network arises from the fact that we restrict ourselves to the En-
glish language as virtually our sole means of communication, which 
limits the use we can make of machines. It may be that we will 
begin to use some slightly modified or even radically modified 
languages in our communications. 
Uses of Machine Retrieval 
It is useful in legal research, for purposes of isolating some of 
those things that may be done wisely by machines, to draw a dis-
tinction between document retrieval and information retrieval. 
By "document retrieval" I mean the process by which you identify 
and locate a document. "Information retrieval" refers to something 
beyond that, to those events that occur after you obtain a docu-
ment. Information retrieval begins when a retrieved document is 
read and related to a problem with the goal of finding a solution 
to that problem. This latter process may be amenable, in part, to 
being done by machine. To date, however, the work that has been 
done has focused almost entirely upon the former process-the 
process of document retrieval. 
It is not surprising that efforts have tended to parallel the tra-
ditional tools which we have been using for years for the purpose 
of locating a document. Although the methods are familiar, the 
particular names which information technologists use are not as 
well known. Briefly, these methods are called citator systems, 
descriptor systems, and key word systems. 
In a citator system, such as Shepard's, the index of relevance of 
a document is the fact that it has been cited in another document. 
It is presumed that, for that reason, it may be useful or relevant 
for another purpose. 
A familiar descriptor system is the West system, containing some 
eighty thousand categories with which a human indexer has associ-
ated a particular document. He has made a judgment that this par-
ticular document is related to this or that category. When we want 
to find that document, we think of the word that designates that 
category and look it up. With so many categories, it is not surpris-
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ing that we frequently run into difficulty trying to guess how a 
particular indexer would classify a particular document. The 
index of relevance in descriptor systems is the association with a 
particular category, a particular word that may or may not be 
mentioned in the actual target document that is being sought. 
A key word system uses yet a third index of relevance: the oc-
currence of a word within the document. The key word systems 
range all the way from what is called "full text searching," which 
refers to searching by the use of all except two or three hundred 
most common words, to a system very similar to the descriptor 
systems, using only a small fraction of the words in a document to 
retrieve that document. 
On the information retrieval side of legal research, there is now 
well over a decade of highly relevant experience. However, despite 
significant research efforts at automatic translation, the quality 
of the automatic translation which we are able to do today is 
not of the highest quality. We certainly can discern what the 
documents are about, but we have encountered great diffculty 
in getting a machine to show the precise content of a document. 
It has become quite clear that our natural language is a much 
more subtle and formidable tool to deal with automatically 
than had been fully appreciated when these efforts began. 
Particularly, it is the syntax of natural language that is rather 
difficult to handle automatically. If we were able to simplify the 
language, in the sense of imposing some standardization or nor-
malization, we could begin to do some of the analysis, some of the 
information retrieval, automatically by machine. We do know 
how to deduce automatically by machine, if we could find a way 
to change the language expressing our ideas to a form that could 
be more adequately processed. 
One such form, particularly useful for the expression of legal 
norms, is the pattern of logical entailment. This pattern involves 
expressing norms in the form: if a specified set of conditions is 
fulfilled with various relations holding between them, then certain 
legal consequences follow. Such ideas can be expressed in a way 
that rather closely follows ordinary English prose. 
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Some work in this vein has been going on at the University of 
Michigan with respect to the Internal Revenue Code. The ideas 
embodied in Sections 354 and 357 of the code (those dealing with 
corporate reorganization) have been re-expressed in a form which 
allows some deduction to be done automatically by machine. It 
was the impression of several of us that this new form was easier for 
us as human beings to work with. \Ve administered a test to a 
group of law students here. \Ve gave the students a version of 
Section 354 that was cast in this normalized form, a second version 
exactly as it is now, and then a series of questions which asked 
about the effects of the statute. Using measurements of speed and 
accuracy as tests, we had instructive results. We anticipated that 
the group would probably be able to work faster, and they did, 
on the average of about twenty percent faster, in dealing with the 
normalized form. The most surprising result was that the order 
of difference in accuracy was better than forty percent in working 
such simplified problems. Because the problems were simplified, 
there were answers that could be evaluated in terms ol' correctness 
and incorrectness. 
Thus, one of the side benefits of work, in trying to see what 
more can be done by machine, is improvement in our manual 
processes for retrieving and processing information. What may be 
an output of this effort, which was originally directed toward more 
automatic processes, is better looseleaf files that begin to have 
more of the characteristics of a dictionary. In a dictionary ,\re have 
a very effective "homing-in" procedure. That is, through the alpha-
betical order of letters used in words, wherever we land in a dic-
tionary we know how to "home in" on where an item will be in the 
file. In organizing a looseleaf file according to the logical properties 
of the sentences used to express the ideas, we can similarly "home 
in" on a location in the file where an item should be, if it is there 
at all. 
Within the kinds of things that lawyers do, there sometimes are 
genuinely scientific problems that ought to be tackled by a sden-
tific method. The nature of legal language happens to be one of 
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them, it seems to me. If I am correct, then we are faced with the 
simple empirical problem of evaluating competing ways of ex-
pressing ideas, in terms of our own ability to deal with them. As 
John Horty remarked, "Once we open the door to our profession 
and let in the mathematicians, logicians, computer scientists and 
others to take a look at the legal profession, the whole process 
of the administration of justice is never going to be the same 
again."1 And the words are having a truer and truer ring with the 
passage of each year. 
J. HoRTY, The "Key Jliords in Combination" Approach, 1962 "1\[oDERN UsEs 
OF LOGIC IN LAW 54, 64. 
